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Many refugee camps today are places of insecurity and o tright danger, both for refugees
and relief workers, and, by virtue of their destabilizing effect, for those living around the camps.
Camps are an essential element of the humanitarian response to refugees, and cannot and should
not be eliminated (as has been suggested elsewhere).   However, they need to be rendered secure
in order to ensure the safety of displaced people and others living and working in and around the
camps.  During the past few decades, the main focus of the international humanitarian response in
asylum countries has been to emphasize assistance at the expense of protection.   Particularly in
the initial emergency phase, physical assistance (“biological needs”) is given priority over
protection and security concerns.  It is proposed in this paper that this focus be re-directed,
particularly in the contingency planning and emergency phases, so as to stress security and
physical protection needs b fore assistance:  that is, adopt a ‘security-first’ approach.  Such an
approach would be the basis of an overall strategy to ensure security and protection in refugee
hosting areas.  This strategy should be ‘regionally appropriate,’ that is, designed in accordance
with the needs and capacities of the various state, international and nonstate actors that participate
in the specific refugee situation. An important part of the strategy, it is argued, is the presence of a
security force in the camps.  Camps cannot be made secure without armed backup, but it is crucial
that such a force be appropriately trained and prepared for refugee situations, and carefully
controlled and monitored.  The specific composition and mandate of such a force would vary
from one host country to another, depending on needs and capacities.
This paper begins with an an lysis of security and safety problems in camps and refugee
hosting areas, and then outlines some ideas about a security-first strategy, including the political
feasibility of a camp security force in the current international context, and how such a force
would be composed, monitored and controlled.  All of these, but especially the latter, are issues
that warrant further discussion, and it is hoped that this paper will motivate such discussion.   The
following qualifications should be noted at the outset:
· The paper focuses on refugee camps rather than IDP camps.  Although IDP camps present
similar kinds of safety concerns, the possible solutions pose very different implementation
problems.
· Not all camps are characterized by physical safety problems; some are relatively safe havens.
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3· Not all refugees live in camps; in most refugee hosting areas a large proportion are self-settled
amongst the local population.
Physical Safety Problems in Refugee Camps and Hosting Areas (RHAs)
A survey of RHA and camp conditions in 1997, set out in Table 1, revealed three main
sources of physical safety problems: a) external military attacks or raids on camps and
surroundings; b) violence and intimidation occurring from sources inside or outside the camps;
and c) a breakdown of law and order in the camps that gives rise to crime and associated
problems.
A. Military Attacks or Raids by Armies, Bandits, Militias, Rebel Groups, etc.
In almost every refugee situation in the past five years (see Table 1), camps have been
subject to some form of military engagement, ranging from artillery bombardment of camps in
eastern Zaire by Rwandan government forces, bombing runs by the Turkish air force of Kurdish
camps in northern Iraq, raids by rebel forces of Sudanese camps in northern Uganda, and ‘hot
pursuit’ raids by Myanmar government forces across the border into Thailand.   Around the
Somali refugee camps in eastern Kenya, bandits have operated with impunity, raping women,
hijacking relief vehicles, and kidnapping relief workers. When camps are attacked or preyed on by
armed gangs, it is not only camp populations and relief workers who are at risk, but also
surrounding communities of local people and self-settled refugees.
Camps are targets for military attacks for two main reasons:
 i. By containing combatants in their midst, camps are perceived by antagonistic forces, either
in the country of origin or in the host country, as giving assistance and protection to their
enemies, and are therefore targeted.  Large numbers of combatants amongst the refugees can
lead to camps becoming militarized, with accordingly increased likelihood of attack.  In
addition, the presence of combatants in camps undermines civilian authority and sources of
law and order, and can lead to camps falling under the control of political or military
elements.  Refugees are then more likely to be deprived of their rights and otherwise subject
to violence and intimidation.
 ii. Camps are largely undefended repositories of resources, including food, vehicles and relief
supplies, as well as people, who can be forcibly recruited for military or sex or labor
purposes, or taken hostage.
In recent years, a third reason for military attacks on camps has emerged.  Governments
involved in internal or regional conflicts have deliberately targeted refugees and camps as part of a
military strategy to weaken and demoralize opponents, and to promote ethnic cleansing. This has
occurred most recently in Kosovo, where Serbian president Milosevic has pursued such tactics,
but also occurs in Sudan and elsewhere, as part of a larger pattern of conflict in which civilians are
4targeted for military purposes.  Camps are particularly likely to be involved in armed engagements
when they are located close to the border or in conflict-prone or sensitive areas.  Then, even if
camps are not directly targeted, their location is more likely to expose refugees to crossfire, or to
landmine fields.
B. Violence and Intimidation
Inside many camps, refugees are subject to intimidation, violence, and harassm nt from a
variety of groups and individuals.  These include other refugees, who use violence for reasons of
ethnic conflict, or political pressure; and camp guards or other host government authorities, who
use physical intimidation to extort resources or sex from refugees, or to pressure refugees to leave
the camps, or enter them, or to repatriate.  Clashes can also occur between refugees and local
people, usually outside the camp, and most often when there is resentment by locals towards
refugees for perceived wrongdoings, such as theft or immoral acts, or for inequities resulting from
refugees’ access to relief resources.
C.  Breakdown of Law and Order
A third reason for camp insecurity is the absence of law and order.  There are two main
reasons for this occurrence:
 i. Especially in the emergency phase, soon after an influx, camp populations consist of
uprooted, often traumatized or destabilized people.  Many refugees are rural people with
little education, who have lost their ties to families and villages, and who find themselves
cast adrift in an alien, unstructured shantytown-like culture.  The result is often increased
crime and violence, or increased likelihood of recruitment into militias or organized crime.
 ii. Transgressions go unpunished because there is no adequate force to back up what rule of
law does exist in camps.  In the absence of effective rule of law, petty and violent crime
flourishes and can lead to camps becoming zones of drug smuggling, human trafficking,
organized crime, illegal logging, and gun running, with the attendant problems of violence.
Relief supplies are diverted to enrich those in control or support the war effort, and the
perpetrators are able to elude justice by hiding amongst the refugee population.  As in any
high crime area, the non-criminal population is subject to more generalized violence, and the
climate of violence leaches out into the surrounding community.  The presence of weapons
(even when hidden) increases the combustibility of the situation in and around the camps, as
does the problem of bored and frustrated young men in camps, who are candidates for
involvement in crime or recruitment to militias.
Making Camps Safe and Secure: Measures and Actors
Securing camps and implementing physical protection requires that the following measures
be undertaken in camps:
5· combatants must be disarmed and demobilized, and nonrefugees3 sepa ated from bona fide
refugees, by screening all those entering the host country (This could entail combatants and/or
nonrefugees being located in separate camps from refugees);
· camps must be maintained as nonmilitarized, weapon-free zones;
· camps must be located (or relocated) at a safe distance from the border, and in a conflict-free
area;
· a climate of law and order must be created and maintained within and outside of the camps.
If these measures were appropriately implemented, they would address many of the safety
problems associated with refugee camps and hosting areas.   However, adherence to these
principles and the implementation of these measures has been patchy or absent in a number of
situations, notably the Great Lakes camps but also elsewhere, largely because host governments
have been unwilling or unable to take the necessary steps to secure the camps.  Before
considering strategies for implementing such measures, it is worth examining the perspectives of
the main actors concerned with security in refugee camps, because doing so will give insight into
the important political context in which solutions to safety problems are developed.
Two sets of actors have responsibility for undertaking these tasks: the host government
and UNHCR.  According to international agreements, including the OAU Refugee Convention,
the Law of Armed Conflicts, the UN Charter, human rights law, and other instruments, the
physical protection and security of refugee camps is in the hands of host governments, who are
supposed to work with UNHCR to ensure the safety of refugees.4 Th se principles require the
host government to ensure that refugee camps remain civilian and humanitarian in nature, that
military elements have been disarmed and removed, and that camps are situated away from border
areas.  In some cases, these principles are put into practice by host states:  police or army forces
are positioned in and around camps, with the duty to ensure the security of the camps and the
safety of refugees.  However, in many other cases, this system of protection does not work, or
does so only poorly.  To understand why this is so, it is necessary to look at the political context
of camps, and the position of the main actors in this context.
A.  The Host Government
The physical safety problems identified above will not always be of concern to the host
government and local authorities, indeed some of the second and third type may even be
perpetrated by them.  Safety problems are most likely to be addressed when they pose direct
security threats or economic problems for the central government, or sometimes for the local
authorities.  In many host countries, developed and developing alike, the political stance of the
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6central government vis a vis refugees and locals is quite different from that of the local
government or authorities, including the military, which control the refugee hosting area.5
Refuge movements occur in periods of regional instability and intensified  political
maneuvering, where the governments of both host and sending countries have a variety of
political, security and economic interests at stake, as do local authorities.  As zones of
concentrated resources and people, camps become integrated into the political and security
context of the region, making it unlikely that they could be neutral, nonpoliticized places.  Instead,
camps are often viewed as components of the conflict, and as resources to further political ends.
Most of the worst cases of camp insecurity occur in regions where the refugee flows and
refugee camps have a long history of militarization. During the Cold War, the militarization of
refugee groups and of camps, such as occurred with Afghan groups in Pakistan or the Khmer
Rouge on the Thai-Cambodian border, was ignored or condoned because of the role they played
in the superpower struggle,6 or because host state supporters of liberation struggles, particularly
in Africa, condoned and enabled the use of refugee camps for use by liberation armies, as
occurred by the Mozambican FRELIMO in Tanzania, by the South African ANC and
Zimbabwean liberation forces (ZAPU) in Zambia.
This situation has changed only in a few w ys since the end of the Cold War.  Camps and
refugees continue to be used and targeted as part of the conflict,7 exc pt that in most cases,
superpower involvement has been reduced, and camp militarization has become less acceptable to
the West.  In the post-Cold War context, host governments’ view of refugee camps and their
willingness to prevent militarization of camps, is motivated by regional and border politics.  This
was graphically illustrated during the Great Lakes refugee crisis from 1994-1997,8 but the
situation also occurs elsewhere, for example in southern Sudan, along the Thai-Burmese border,
and along the Tanzanian-Burundian border, to name only a few.  Now, as ever, refugees and
camps are part of the political strategies of host and sending governments, as well as whoever
may be supporting these governments behind the scenes.
                                       
5 This difference has manifested itself in the United States, when the government of Florida took a stand
against the federal government’s Cuban immigration policy in 1994, and forced the federal government to
reconsider its position.  Presentation by Rick Nuccio at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, October 9,
1998.
6  Much has been written on the political impact of refugees. See Zolberg, A. R., Suhrke, A. and Aguayo,
S., Escape From Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World.  New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989; Weiner, M., The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and Human Rights.
HarperCollins, 1995.  Loescher, Gil. 1993.  Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee
Crisis.  New York: Oxford University Press.
7  “...in many instances, large-scale movements of people - whether from, to or within their country of
origin - have been deliberately provoked or engineered by the parties to armed conflicts, with the specific intention
of furthering their political and military interests.” UNHCR/OAU 1998.  Regional Meeting on Refugee Issues in
the Great Lakes.  Kampala, 8-9 May 1998.  Paper 1, Regional Protection and Security in the Great Lakes Region,
p.2
8 Boutroue, Joel. 1998.  Missed Opportunities:  The Role Of The International Community In The Return Of
The Rwandan Refugees From Eastern Zaire.  Cent r for International Studies, M.I.T. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
7That governments can determine the fate of camps, including whether or not they become
militarized, is illustrated by the fact that a host government can respond to different refugee
groups and their camp situations in different ways.  A few examples illustrate:
· Since the late 1980s, the Thai-Burmese border has been repeatedly crossed by Burmese ethnic
minorities and other groups fleeing the repression of the junta in power in Burma.  The Thai
authorities have allowed small camps and settlements to become established inside Thailand,
but these camps have never become militarized, despite the mobilization within Burma of the
ethnic minorities and their continuing resistance to the regime.  Why has no militarization of
the camps occurred?  The Thai government has had close ties with the Burmese military
authorities, as well as economic interests in Burmese natural resources, and has thus had no
interest in enabling military opposition to the regime.  By contrast, the Thai authorities
permitted the existence of Khmer Rouge military camps along the Thai-Cambodian border
during the 1980s, because the Thais were in favor of there being a militarized buffer zone
between Thailand and the Vietnamese then occupying Cambodia.
· The Tanzanian government permitted and encouraged FRELIMO forces to use refugee camps
as resources in their fight against the Portuguese colonial authorities in Mozambique during
the early 1970s, and allowed FRELIMO military bases to be located in Tanzania.  By contrast,
the Tanzanian authorities did their best (but largely failed) to prevent the Rwandan refugee
camps from being used by Rwandan militias, whom the Tanzanians did not support.  By
contrast again, the Tanzanians have been turning something of a blind eye to the presence of
combatants in the Burundian refugee camps.  The Tanzanian government is opposed to the
current regime in Burundi.
As a consequence of their history of militarization, most refugee camps ar  plagued by the
problem of “mixed populations,” that is, the presence of combatants and criminals among the
refugees. In most camp situations, the refugee population includes both non-combatants (usually
women, children, elderly) and combatants, either actual or potential.  Even if efforts are made to
exclude actual combatants from camps (as is required by UNHCR mandate), it is difficult to
enforce such exclusion for any length of time.  Combatants are easily able to shed their weapons
and uniforms in order to enter the camps.  If camps are close to the border this enables refugee
combatants more easily to mobilize and conduct guerilla forays across the border.  The
militarization of camps leads to all manner of security problems, as discussed above.
 Even if host governments do not actively encourage the militarization of camps, there may
be a general reluctance to host refugees, stemming from concerns about the economic or
environmental burden posed by refugees or from potential security concerns.  These concerns are
often accompanied by the desire to see rapid repatriation, which can in turn translate into
deliberate non-protection (“humane deterrence”) as a way to encourage repatriation.  This
absence of will to protect refugees on the part of governments can also lead to camps and
refugees being located too close to borders, or in zones of conflict, and thus vulnerable to ‘hot
pursuit’ raids or artillery fire.  Badly located camps are targeted by rebel groups or bandits for
their resources, especially vehicles, but also food and medical supplies, or for the purposes of
forced conscription.  Even nonmilitarized camps or refugee settlements can thus become part of
8the war economy. This is a common occurrence, for example, in northwest Uganda, where rebel
groups have attacked refugee settlements, sometimes shooting relief personnel or taking hostages,
stealing relief supplies and hijacking vehicles.  More examples are found in Table 1.
Host government failure to provide physical protection is not always only an issue of
absent political will, but sometimes occurs because of lack of capacity.  It is not always possible
to locate camps in a deliberate way; refugees often spontaneously set up their own camps close to
the border in order to facilitate return or monitor the situation in their home region, and then it is
difficult to relocate them.  In situations where armed combatants are mixed up with refugees, the
only effective way to screen them out and keep them out is by means of an armed force.
Although initial screening and disarming of incoming refugees sometimes is carried out at border
crossing points by host authorities, it is not always effective—and of course, not all refugees come
through border crossings.  The authorities can be overwhelmed by numbers, inadequately trained,
or otherwise unwilling or able to accomplish this task, and many arms or combatants “get
through” and mix with bona fide refugees.  Unless entering combatants are willing to yield their
arms, it is often difficult for unarmed border officials or UNHCR Protection Officers to disarm
combatants.  Similarly, without adequate military backup, it is difficult to ensure that the civilian
nature of a refugee camp is sustained, and that weapons are eliminated from and kept out of
camps.
Host governments often do not have sufficient or adequately trained and equipped forces,
either police or military, to provide adequate and appropriate physical protection in camps.  Lack
of capacity is especially problematic in less developed host countries, particularly in border
regions, which are less accessible and often beyond the reach of central governments.
B.  UNHCR and other relief agencies
When host governments will not or cannot implement protection measures, or in cases
where there is no effective or functioning host government, who has responsibility for the physical
protection of refugees?  The responsibility for protection is often relegated to UNHCR, which is
also blamed for physical protection problems,9 despite their not having either the mandate or
capacity for physical protection, to say nothing of other security concerns.  In some cases,
UNHCR has tried to take on responsibility for camp security, as in the Goma camps10 in 1994-96,
but these have been ad hoc responses and although partially successful in the Goma case, on the
whole they have been less than satisfactory responses.
In most cases, UNHCR, NGOs and donors can only pressure host governments to provide
the needed protection.  When diplomatic pressure fails to produce results, relief agencies are faced
with the problem of what to do.  When camps become militarized, or when attacks on personnel
occur, relief agencies must decide whether to remain in the camps and continue to provide
assistance, but turn a blind eye to the violations taking place, or to withdraw from the camps.  It is
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9difficult to discern a pattern of withdrawal:  much depends on the politics of the situation as well
as the likelihood of things improving.  In northern Iraq, UNHCR withdrew from Atroush camp
when it became too militarized; in eastern Zaire, they did not withdraw.  In May 1993, Medecins
sans Frontières (Belgium) withdrew most of its women workers from camps in northeastern
Kenya after reports of a high incidence of assaults on refugees and aid workers.  In northern
Uganda in 1996, Oxfam, the largest NGO operating there, withdrew its staff after a series of
assaults including abductions and robbery.  In eastern Zaire, however, MSF withdrew, as did
other NGOs, but Oxfam remained.
Apart from withdrawal, other options for UNHCR are rather meager.  The use of the Exclusion
Clause as a way to keep camps free of combatants has not been widely used, and also requires the
presence of a military or police force to carry out the ejection of combatants from the camps.11
Ensuring Physical Protection in Camps: Security and Protection First
Until recently, the main focus of the international humanitarian response has been to
emphasize physical (biological) assistance at the expense of physical protection and human
rights.12 In the past year or so, largely as an outcome of the 1994-97 crisis in the Great Lakes,
there has been widespread condemnation of the presence of combatants in camps, and calls for
more stringent efforts to separate combatants from refugees.  UNHCR has sought to address
physical protection problems more directly.  The High Commissioner13 and the Di ector of the
Division of Protection14 have made emphatic statements to various UN bodies, including the
Security Council, and to host states, about the need for mechanisms to improve the physical
protection and security of refugees and camp populations.  The High Commissioner has stressed
the need for practical ways to address security problems, and has proffered such concepts as a
“ladder of options,” which sets out a variety of responses depending on the security problems and
needs of the refugee hosting area.
The leadership of UNHCR and other agencies has thus demonstrated a heightened
concern about security problems and refugee protection.  However, as yet these concerns are not
reflected in UNHCR’s recent contingency plans.  A draft of the contingency plan for the Great
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Lakes Region in the context of the current insurgency in the DRC (October 1998), prepared by
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), contained barely a mention of
security and protection needs and was entirely focused on plans for providing cross-border
assistance and humanitarian needs.15
Ways must be found to support and strengthen the recent calls for renewed emphasis on
physical protection and safety in RHAs.  The balance between protection and assistance must be
re-set.  The remainder of this paper suggests a strategy for pursuing this goal.
A.  A Rights-based, Safety-First Strategy: The Need for Force
It is argued here that the primary focus of UNHCR’s response, both in the contingency
planning and in the emergency phases, should be changed so as to stress safety and protection
before assistance.   This may be called a ‘safety and protection-first’ approach.16  From their
inception, camps must be located, set up, and secured, to the extent possible, so as to ensure the
physical safety of refugees and all camp denizens, prevent future problems for the surrounding
area, and to make the delivery of assistance safe (and perhaps more efficient).  At the same time,
safety measures must be tempered by legal protection considerations; that is, the rights of
refugees must undergird the safety-first approach.
The only truly effective way to secure camps is by means of a force that is trained in issues
of refugee protection and has the mandate and capability to use armed force in a refugee context.
Many within the relief community have recognized the need for a security force in camps, or a
more generalized ‘humanitarian protection force.’17  Various international and state actors have
also recognized the need for such a force.  In his April 1998 Report on the Situation in Africa, the
UN Secretary General urged “the establishment of an internatio al mechanism to assist host
governments in maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps and settlements.”  “Such
a mechanism,” he continues, “might encompass training, logistics, financial support, the provision
of security  personnel and the monitoring of national security arrangements.”
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has sought to refine such a mechanism and has
advocated a ladder of options.  In calling on donor states for “concrete action on behalf of victims
of violence,” she stated that such action will have to be in the form of security support:
Every situation...requires a specific response.  It should not be a matter of all or nothing—
or, in other words, a massive military operation with overwhelming force or no action at
all.  There should be a ladder of options—from military operations to peacekeeping
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operations, to civilian police, armed or unarmed, UN Guards, or the kind of civilian
arrangements we have been involved in ourselves.  What we need is a kind of Rapidly
Deployable Arrangement that can intervene in order to create a safe environment for
humanitarian action.18
However, even if such a force were to be available, it is not enough simply to plug it into
any situation and hope for the best.  Camp safety and protection are best approached from a sub-
regional, strategic perspective, rather than as an international mechanism designed ‘from above’
that can be plugged in anywhere. A sub-regional perspective means assessing the area-specific
physical protection needs and capacities of the host and sending countries, and devising goals and
plans accordingly.
In some cases, a safety-first plan could be piggybacked on state or regional security
initiatives.  Recently, there have been several regional intergovernmental initiatives aimed at pre-
empting or addressing security and other regional concerns.  For example, in 1998, in response to
the Secretary-General’s Africa Report,  ECOWAS drafted a proposal for the establishment of a
“Mechanism for the Prevention, Management Resolution of Conflicts, Peace-keeping and
Security”.  This mechanism envisages the establishment of an ECOWAS Mediation and Security
Council, which will be empowered to authorize intervention to restore or maintain peace.19 This
kind of political initiative and will must be taken advantage of in planing for refugees’ safety.
A safety-first strategy will include different elements depending on the requirements of the
specific receiving area, but one essential element is a unit trained to use armed force when
necessary and to back up security measures.  What is envisioned is a country-based C mp
Security Force, which would capable of carrying out the protection tasks identified earlier,
namely:
· disarming and demobilizing combatants, and/or separating them and other nonrefugees from
bona fide refugees, by screening all those entering the host country;
· maintaining camps as weapon-free zones;
· when necessary, relocating camps at a safe distance from the border, and in a conflict-free
area;
· maintaining a climate of law and order within and outside of the camps.
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B.  Planning a Strategy for Camp Safety
Two phases to a safety- and protection-first strategy are envisioned: a pre-influx,
contingency planning phase, and a post-influx phase including both the emergency and post-
emergency, care-and-maintenance periods.
I. Contingency Planning Phase
At present, in order to prepare for refugee emergencies, UN Country Teams in host
countries have contingency plans (CPs), which are regularly updated.  Many of these CPs do not
presently contain physical protection components, but it is entirely possible to adapt existing CPs
to a safety-first orientation.  Many of the elements of such a strategy are already in place, or are in
the process of being set up, as a result of the new approach to coordination of humanitarian
assistance embodied in the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).  In
the Great Lakes Region, for example, there are planned UN Joint Logistics Centers, as well as
existing UN Country Teams working within an inter-agency framework that includes major NGO
partners and host government authorities.
In pursuing a safety- and protection-oriented approach, UN Country Teams could add or
reinforce the following components:
· Host government authorities.  Since the Camp Security Force will be drawn from the army or
police, the relevant government representatives from both the army and line ministries must be
active on the team;
· Local government authorities, who will be equally important in cases where local army or
police units provide the Camp Security Force;
· Seconded UN Department of Peacekeeping Officers (DPKO) who could advise about security
needs and assist with the training and preparation of the Camp Security Force;
· Human rights monitors.  These could be UNHCR Protection Officers, UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights or ICRC officials, or official observers from human rights
NGOs.  Their task will be to advise and help train the Camp Security Force as to refugees’
rights;
· Local leaders and representatives.  The team should also include or consult with local leaders
in making decisions concerning camp location, transit centers and so forth.
Contingency plan goals include:
a)  Identification, training and supervision of the Camp Security Force.  Host government
authorities, and particularly local authorities, will play a major role in deciding where the force
would come from, that is, whether and which police or military forces could be used.  Training,
capacity-building and supervision of the force would occur during this period.  The roles of UN
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agencies and NGOs in this aspect of the plan would be advisory or monitoring only, since they
have no comparative advantage when it comes to police work.  However, DPKO officials can
potentially play an active role in training and supervision.  In situations where the host
government lacks the capacity to create such a force, decisions must be taken as to which
international organization or donor state could take on this task.
b)  Logistical review of options for screening posts, transit centers and camp location, utilizing
past experience where possible, and incorporating input of local population.  Camp location and
layout would be planned with security as a priority.
c)  Decisions about what will be done with screened out nonrefugees and combatants.
II.  Post-influx Phase
During and after a refugee influx, not all refugees enter camps, but in sustained complex
emergencies a significant number spend some time in camps.  There are normally two operational
phases to camp implementation:  the initial emergency stage, when a refugee flow first occurs,
followed by the ‘care and maintenance’ phase.  The lengths of these phases vary, depending on
circumstances, but the emergency phase is generally only a few weeks long, while the care and
maintenance phase can stretch into decades.  Each phase requires different security interventions,
but if adequate security and protection are accomplished early in the emergency phase, the
ensuing security goals will be more easily achieved.  This occurs because, if camps can quickly be
demilitarized and rendered as civilian and relatively neutral zones, two of the main causes of
insecurity will be minimized:  first, camps will not be seen as places harboring combatants and
therefore will be less likely to be attacked for military reasons, and second, in the absence of
combatants, camps are more likely to become places of law and order where crime does not
flourish.  Demilitarization of camps will not necessarily address the third cause of insecurity—
their targeting by rebels and bandits for their resources—but reducing two out the three causes of
insecurity will allow a focus upon the third cause.
Conclusion
In recent years, a number of researchers have suggested that camps themselves are at the root of
protection problems, and that the eradication of camps will go a long way to resolving these
problems.20  However, camps neither can nor should be eliminated; they are an essential element
                                       
20 For a review of this approach, see Forc d Migration Review, No.2, August .
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of the humanitarian response to refugees, both for efficacy of assistance programs and because
they are potentially a major source of protection and safety for refugees.  What is required is a re-
orientation of humanitarian assistance away from a focus on meeting the physical needs of
refugees and towards ensuring their security and protection.
This paper has argued that the only practical way to ensure the safety of camps and
protection of refugees, what might be called security, is to pursue a security strategy underpinned
simultaneously by a trained and armed Camp Security Force and by a rights-based orientation.
There are a variety of precedents for a Camp Security Force, ranging from the US Military Police
used in the Cuban and Haitian camps at Guantanemo Bay, to the Zairean Presidential Guard used
in the Goma camps.  These and other cases must be further examined to determine which
elements can feasibly be extracted and used or adapted for forthcoming refugee camp scenarios.
In turn, human rights monitoring has become much more effective and widespread in recent years,
and human rights organizations are increasingly astute at pursuing their goals.  It is timely and
feasible now to combine force and human rights to protect refugees and those caught up with
them.  The biggest constraints, as always, are the political ones.  It will require the sustained will
of donors and host states, working with UNHCR and NGOs, to implement such a safety-first,
rights-based strategy.  Given the apparently serious and widespread concerns about the security
problems associated with refugees, there might presently be a window of opportunity for such an
endeavor.
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Security Threats to Refugees in Major Host Countries in Africa and Asia,1997
This table summarizes the actual and potential physical threats to the main refugee groups in host
countries in Africa and Asia with refugee populations of over 20,000 in 1997.  The table is not
exhaustive, but is intended to give some idea of the types of threats confronting refugees.  The table
excludes refugee populations in Europe and Palestinians refugees in the Middle East.
Note: Since this is a ‘snapshot’ of refugees in host countries in 1997, many  refugee situations have
changed, and in some cases, full repatriation has occurred (eg.  Chakma returned from India to
Bangladesh).  If refugees entered a host country and then repatriated during 1997, they are not included
in the table.
Types of Threats and Likely Causes
Nature of Threat to Refugee Settlement
Site/Camp
Likely Causes
Direct military attack or bombardment presence of combatants among refugees;
to force repatriation or break up (militarized) camps
Caught in cross-fire or armed conflict sites too close to border or located in zone of conflict or
civil war in host country
Armed raids by rebel groups or enemy
forces
for resources or hostages;
to force or prevent repatriation;
forced conscription;
recrimination
Ethnic or political (factional) conflict
between refugees or between refugees and
locals
poor organization or management of camps;
ineffective policing by host authorities;
refugees and/or locals are dissatisfied or resentful about
camp conditions;
violent crime inside or outside settlementabsence of law and order or ineffective policing of
settlement area
abuse or intimidation by camp authorities or
refugee leaders
to prevent or encourage repatriation;
absence of law and order or ineffective policing of
settlement area
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Table 1
Main Refugee Populations and Security Threats, 1997
I.  Africa
Of the 51 states in Africa, 20 hosted refugee populations of over 20,000 in 1997, and of these host countries,
refugee experienced serious security problems in 10 of them, as summarized in this table.
Note: many of these host countries hosted multiple ‘case loads’ i.e. refugee populations from different sending
countries, but if a particlar ‘case load’ did not experience significant security problems it is not listed in the table.
Host
Country
(UNHCR
Total Refs)a
Country of
Origin
Total/UNHCR-
assistedb
Refugee Distribution in Host
Country
Threats to refugees
(actual and potential)
Sudan
374,400
Eritrea
315,000/119,800
One third dispersed among 25
settlements in eastern region;
remainder urban
 civil war in Sudan might affect
settlements
Ethiopia
44,300/14,800
15,000 in settlement sites and
camps; remainder urban
civil war in Sudan might affect
settlements
Ethiopia
323,100
Sudan
56,900/all
4 camps in w
Sherkole (in Assosa)
none reported/unknown, but effects of
Sudan civil war might affect camps;
Camps divided along ethnic lines to
avoid hostilities among refugees
Kenya
232,100
Somalia
174,100/134,100
120,000 in 3 camps in Dadaab (ne
region)
rapes, robbery, carjackings by bandits
outside camps
Sudan 37,400/all Kakuma camp (nw) region  Sudanese rebels in camps exert pressure
on refugees
Uganda
188,500
Sudan 160,400/allArua/nw region Ugandan rebels attacks on settlements;
Sudanese rebels in settlements exert
pressure to repatriate
Rwanda
34,200
Burundi
6,900/2,300
3 sites in south  harassment and threats of expulsion
from Rwandan officials
DRC
27,100/26,600
2 camps on western border Camps attacked by Hutu insurgents,
general insecurity/civil war of region
Tanzania
570,400
Burundi
459,400/259,400
8 main camps along border spilling over of conflict in Burundi into
camps;
political factions among refugees led to
tension and violence, in turn this led to
refoulement by Tanzanian authorities
DRC 74,300/all 2 large camps on border hardline elements sought to inhibit
repatriation; Tanzanian authorities
crackdown led to aggressive refoulement
Host
Country
(UNHCR
Total Refs)a
Country of
Origin
Total/UNHCR-
assistedb
Refugee Distribution in Host
Country
Threats to refugees
(actual and potential)
Dem.  Rep.
Congo
(DRC)
297,500
Rwanda
37,000/2,900
“the lost refugees”
3 makeshift camps subject to
“insurmountable logistical
difficulties” (UNHCR) then
overtaken by war
thousands fled camps after outbreak of
civil war and trekked into jungle,
massive loss of life
Burundi
47,000/5,900
sites and self-settled along bordercivil war in DRC led to widespread
insecurity of refugees
Sudan 61,200/all farming sites in ne DRC civil war led to repatriation but
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effects unknown
Uganda 44,300/allself-settled DRC civil war led to repatriation but
effects unknown
Congo
20,600
Angola
20,600/5,900
6,000 in camps near city of Point-
Noire
ot directly affected by Congo civil war,
but concern about presence of Angolan
forces hostile to refugees
Liberia
126,900
Sierra Leone
126,800/25,000
sites along border sites shelled by forces in Sierra Leone
Guinea
435,300
Liberia 243,000/allsites in Forest region along borderGuinean police and military have
subjected refugees to harassment and
extortion
Sierra Leone
192,200/180,200
sites in Forest region along borderGuinean police and military have
subjected refugees to harassment and
extortion
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II.  Asia
37 states in Asia hosted refugees in 1997, and of these, 13 hosted populations of over 20,000.  Of these, refugees
experienced security problems in 6 of them.
Host
Country
(UNHCR
Total Refs)a
Country of
Origin
Total/UNHCR-
assistedb
Refugee Distribution in Host
Country
Threats to refugees
(actual and potential)
Thailand
169,200
Burma
105,200/2,100
many camps along Burmese borderattacks from Burmese forces;
refoulement by Thai forces
Iran
1,982,600
Afghanistan
1,411,800/all
self-settled and 32 government-run
camps
none reported/unknown, but possible
forced repatriation
Iraq
570,800
mixed with Afghans none reported/unknown, but possible
forced repatriation
Iraq
104,000
Turkey
10,900/all
Kurds in Atrush camp near bordercross-border attacks by Turkish forces
Iran
29,400/all
Kurds in local settlements and a
camp in northern Iraq
Factional fighting amongst Kurds and
attacks by government forces
Yemen
38,500
Somalia
37,400/8,700
9,000 in AL-Gahin camp, rest
urban
none reported/unknown, but possible
forced repatriation
Bangladesh
21,600
Burma
21,500/all
2 camps clashes between refugees and authorities
sparked by forced repatriation by
authorities
India
223,100
Bangladesh
40,100/-
camps in Tripura pressure from Indian authorities to
repatriate
a Number refers to total number of refugees in host country, according to UNHCR 1997 Statistical
Overview, Table 1.
b Considers only refugee populations over 20,000.  UNHCR 1997 Statistical Overview, Table 3.  The
usual caveats about estimating refugee numbers apply.
Sources:
World Refugee Survey, U.S.  Committee for Refugees, Washington D.C.  1998.
UNHCR 1997 Statistical Overview , UNHCR, Geneva 1998.
